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Abstract
Vulnerability to reduction of natural capital depends on defensive sub-
stitution possibilities that, in turn, are a®ected by the availability of other
productive factors. However in several developing countries asset distri-
bution tends to be highly skewed. Taking into account these elements,
this paper proposes a model considering an economy polarized into two
classes (the rich and the poor) and characterized by the following stylized
facts: income and productivity of the rural poor is highly dependent on
natural resources; labour remuneration in rural sector represents the op-
portunity cost for wage labour; the rich can partially substitute natural
capital with physical capital accumulation and wage labour employment.
In this context, agents di®er for feed back mechanisms and interactions
between their choices of production and environmental dynamics. More-
over environmental depletion may trigger economic transition, but the
structural change is likely to result regressive.
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11 Introduction
In the economic literature the environment has been studied from opposing per-
spectives and as a bivalent concept. It has been seen as a \source" of value and
wealth: water, land and the other natural resources are the basis of our sub-
sistence and, at the same time, they are assets that can be used in economic
activities for generating income or self-consumed goods. Thus, environment
preservation and access to natural resources has been regarded as a crucial re-
quirement especially for livelihood defence of rural poor populations that tend
to be highly dependent on natural resources and vulnerable to environmental
degradation. In fact, it is commonly recognized that no long-term strategy of
poverty alleviation can succeed in the face of forces that promote the persistent
erosion of the resources upon which poor people depend (Leonard 1989, UNDP
2005).
On the other hand, economic doctrine views the environment as a limit to
economic growth and, therefore, to the expansion of well-being: economic ac-
tivities based on natural capital exploitation are subject to the bounds of their
productive inputs. Land is considered a ¯xed and non-reproducible asset; non-
renewable resources are prone to exhaustion, while reproduction of renewable
resources cannot surpass their carrying capacity. Dependence on resource-based
activities, for example, has been regarded as an obstacle to escape from poverty:
given that the rural poor largely rely on natural capital for their subsistence,
they depend on low-income generating activities and they are also prone to en-
tering a vicious circle of further impoverishment and environmental degradation.
On the contrary, many studies ¯nd that access to non-agricultural activities can
represent a poverty alleviation strategy1 : rural households that get o®-farm
jobs can experience a rise in their labour productivity and earnings.
Such perspective is also consistent with the hypothesis that the evolution of
an economic system towards less resource-dependent productions is a successful
way to expand productive possibilities and to drive the economy to higher level
of economic production and well-being while at the same time overcoming na-
ture's constraint. As observed by L¶ opez (2007) there is a quite strong consensus
on the role of structural change (i.e. a labour shift from traditional agricultural
sectors) as a cause and consequence of economic development and growth (Lewis
1On the role of o®-farm (rural or urban) labour in raising household income, see: Weiming
et al. (2004) for China, Escobal (2002) for Peru, De Janvry and Sadoulet (2000) for Mexico
and Central America, Reardon et al. (1998) for Latin America.
21955, Ranis and Fei 1962, Lucas 2004): expansion of the non-resource sectors
may permit an unending process of labour productivity growth because they
rely on assets (human capital and physical capital) that can expand over time.
On the other hand, Lopez (2003, 2007) notes that many middle-low income
countries2 experienced a structural change associated with growing problems
of environmental degradation in addition to low performances in the struggle
against poverty. In this case, environmental pressures can have a role in trigger-
ing o® what he refers as \perverse structural change", namely a labour migration
from agricultural sector pushed by a decline in productivity of agricultural tra-
ditional activities and the consequent reduction of labour opportunity cost3.
The result is an expansion of informal urban activities (instead of economic
activities of the modern sector) with declining or stagnant wages and less pos-
itive economic trends. Two direct factors4 that L¶ opez identi¯es as responsible
for the emergence of perverse structural changes are natural resource degrada-
tion and processes of disenfranchisement of part of the rural poor from access
to natural resources. In turn, these factors can be caused by demographic ex-
pansion, environmental externalities of economic production, expulsion of rural
communities due to an expansion in commodities or manufacturing activities,
large investments in hydroelectric and irrigation projects, other infrastructures
or other types of enclosures of natural common goods.
Our model follows Lopez's approach in that we try to embody the role of en-
vironmental externalities in shaping a process of structural change by focusing
on the channel of labour costs and labour productivity, but we will attempt to
adopt a distributive perspective too.
The purpose is to present a theoretical model aiming at contributing to the
analysis of the role that the environment may play in the relationship between
growth, poverty and distribution in the light of some peculiarities of several
2In particular he refers to Latin America, but the observation is valid for many other
countries too.
3L¶ opez (2003) observes that in developing countries labour remuneration in primary sector
(especially traditional primary activities that use labour intensive techniques) is still likely
to represent the basic opportunity cost or °oor wage for unskilled labour and, correcting
for skill di®erentials, of the whole economy. In fact, the primary sector still absorbs a large
share of labour, especially unskilled labour. In conclusion, if in developing countries labour
remuneration in traditional agriculture is not always directly associated with economic growth,
it is likely to be linked to wages in the other sectors and, through this channel, to poverty.
4Lopez points out that indirect factors capable to trigger a perverse structural change are
inadequate policies aiming at fostering productivity in the modern sector in addition to a
complete neglect of traditional subsistence sector of the rural poor.
3developing countries5. Understanding the conditions and factors related to the
environmental dynamics that in°uence distributional, poverty and economic
outcomes may give us a clue about how to maximize bene¯ts from the envi-
ronment or, conversely, minimize its limits in the struggle against poverty. We
aim to shed light on the distributional impact of environmental degradation
and to investigate how the e®ects of environmental dynamics change in relation
to asset endowments and de¯nition of production functions. Indeed, in many
developing countries, asset distribution is highly concentrated. Di®erences in
asset endowment and composition determine di®erences in terms of constraints
and opportunities in the choices of income generating strategies. Thus, produc-
tion functions and sectoral structure in the economic systems partially re°ects
asset and income distribution. At the same time, vulnerability to environmental
degradation is linked to the degree of dependency on natural resources (i.e. on
production function) and on ability to adopt defensive strategies, namely the
ability to substitute environmental resources with other productive assets. That
is, in the societies where there is a polarization in the asset distribution, agents
di®er not only for their income, but also for their vulnerability to environmental
depletion. Thus the poor, especially in rural areas, tend to be more dependent
on natural resources and more vulnerable to ecosystem degradation6 (IFAD
2001a-b, 2002; Dasgupta 1993 and 2001; UNDP et al., 2005, UNEP 2004). On
the other hand, the rich have a higher ability to substitute private goods for
public ones. Thus, they are able to self-protect themselves from pollution and
to face depletion of natural capital (UNEP 2004). Besides, the rich may have
the power to access to natural resources at a lower cost because of their power
and lack of well de¯ned and enforceable property rights.
In the light of these elements, the model will consider di®erent production func-
tions for the rich and the poor, while a di®erent grade of resource dependence
5In the model natural resources are represented by a free access renewable resource. Ac-
tually di®erent property right regimes (open, private, public, and communitarian) usually
coexist, but the impossibility to introduce such a complex setting into a theoretical model
compels making a choice and the assumption of stable institutions is made: property right
regime does not change along the process of structural change. Given that many develop-
ing countries are a®ected by ill-de¯ned property rights (and it is particularly valid for the
resource endowments of the poor), open access is analysed as an extreme case of this type of
institutional failure.
A comprehensive review of the empirical and theoretical literature on the e®ects of di®erent
property right regimes in terms of distribution and sustainability is beyond the scope of this
article.
6Microeconomic studies and meta-analyses con¯rm the relevance of dependence of rural
population on community or free access resources (Jodha 1986, Cavendish 2000, Falconer
1990, Back and Nesmith 2001, Fisher 2004, Hecht et al. 1988 cited in Friedman and Rangan
1993, Narain et al. 2005, Vedeld et al. 2004).
4will be contemplated. Our model considers a small open economy7 with two
sectors: a traditional resource-based sector that rely on self-employment of poor
households and a sector managed by the rich. Unlike L¶ opez (2007) and Elias-
son and Turnovsky (2004), that distinguish between a clean and a dirty sector,
the model proposed in this work follows a sector classi¯cation based on asset
endowment of the two groups and contemplates the possibility that both sec-
tors cause environmental externalities but no assumptions on relative di®erence
in the degree of such impact are made and alternative scenarios are consid-
ered. Potentiality of poor and rich producers to cause environmental depletion
and degradation can be considered an empirical issue changing according to
the institutional, natural and economic settings and their dynamics. The em-
pirical research ¯nds many examples of unsustainable use of natural resources
perpetrated by the poor and by the rich, while, as noted by a recent UNDP re-
port (2005), experience of interactions between poverty and environment varies
from location to location8. At the same time, the empirical literature shows
many examples of erosion of the subsistence basis of the rural poor caused by
manufacturing, extractive industries, and mechanized agriculture or by policies
focusing on the promotion of the capitalistic sector9. More recently, the World
Bank (2007) has studied the negative e®ects of Chinese economic boom, indus-
tralization and urbanization on productivity of agriculture and ¯shery, while
according to the 2005 Human Development Report it has been estimated that
between 1987 and 2001, non agricultural projects caused the legally or illegaly
land expropriation of 40-50 millions of farmers. RIF: World Bank (2007).
Therefore a model aiming at describing interactions between the production
choices of the rich and the poor should comprise a sector managed by the rich
that produces environmental externalities on the poor. The degree of such exter-
7The majority of developing countries are little open economies. In the last two decades,
several countries have undertaken trade liberalization reforms and, consequently, the impor-
tance of the domestic demand in sustaining economic growth has diminished (at least for trade
sectors) because economies are less constrained by a limited national demand. On the contrary
in open economies, a fundamental factor for economic growth is productive competitiveness
that depends, among other important factors, on labour cost .
8An extensive review of the debate on poverty-environment linkages is provided by Op-
schoor (2007).
9Ghai and Vivian (1992) collected studies on struggles by poor communities to gain con-
trol over natural resources and to face iniquities and environmental degradation caused by
capitalists interests often with state support. Also Stonich (1989) and Friedman and Rangan
(1993) review episodes of \enclosures" that have a®ected poor populations. In the same way,
Martines-Alier (2002) reports other cases of what he calls \environmentalism of the poor".
The impact on poverty and deforestation induced by mechanized agriculture and expansion
of livestock numbers and timber extraction is analysed by De Janvry and Garcia 1988, Health
and Binswanger 1996, Leonard 1989, L¶ opez 1992, Markandaya 2001.
5nalities will depend on specialisation in dirty or clean production and therefore
it is likely to vary from one country to another.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
model. Section 3 analyses the model and investigates the dynamics that may
emerge from the model, their implications in terms of well-being and the condi-
tions for their existence. Section 4 draws conclusions and gives some suggestions
for future research.
2 The model
We consider a small open economy with three factors of production: labour,
a free access renewable natural resource (E) and physical capital (K). In this
economy agents belong to two di®erent populations: the \Rich" (R-agents)
and the \Poor" (P-agents). The R-agents own physical capital, hire labour
force and employ all their potential work - represented by a ¯xed amount of
entrepreneurial activity - in the capitalistic sector producing a private good
(YR). We call their production \capitalistic sector" or \market sector". The
P-agents are endowed only with labour and they have to choose the allocation
of their labour between two activities: working as employee for the Rich in
the capitalistic sector or directly exploiting natural resources to produce a non
storable good. Let \subsistence sector" or \rural sector" denote production of
the Poor.
2.1 The maximization problem of the Poor and the pro-
duction in the traditional sector
The population of the Poor is constituted by a continuum of identical individuals
and the size of the population is represented by the positive parameter N. The
P-population well-being depends on two goods:
² A good deriving directly from free access renewable natural resources,
hereafter referred to as environmental good.
² A good (hereafter denoted private good) produced in the capitalistic sector
which can be consumed as a substitute for the services coming from the
environmental good.
6We assume that the instantaneous utility function of each P-agent is the follow-
ing
UP(cP;cs) = ln(cP + acs) (1)
where:
cs : is the consumption of the produced good as a substitute for the environ-
mental good.
cP : is the consumption deriving from the exploitation of the environmental
resource. According to (1), cs and cP are perfect substitutes, with a (constant)
rate of substitution equal to a > 0 . That is, the private good produced by
the Rich is able to substitute completely cP. This is a stylized fact, but it can
represent the main components of Poor people's well-being: if they work in the
subsistence sector in rural areas (¯shing, forestry, agriculture or breeding) their
standard of living strictly depends on access to and exploitation of E; while if
they move to urban zones or they become wage labour force, they satisfy their
needs mainly through the consumption of private goods. Each P-agent, in each
instant of time, employs all her potential labour (that we normalize to unity)
in the subsistence sector or in the sector of the Rich. Thus, she cannot rely on
alternative income sources at the same time. However, in the absence of inter-
sectorial moving costs, signi¯cant divergences from the case with employment
diversi¯cation are not a priori expected. Therefore, for the sake of analytical
simplicity, the hypothesis of indivisible labour allocation will be kept.
Let us indicate with NP and NR the number of the Poor that work, respec-
tively, in the rural subsistence sector and in the capitalist sector. Consequently
we have NP + NR = N. The aggregate production function in the rural sector
is given by
YP = ®NPE (2)
This speci¯cation was proposed by Schae®er (1957) for ¯shery and since then
it has widely adopted in literature in modelling natural resources (Munro and
Scott 1993, Conrad 1995, Brander and Taylor 1998a and 1998b, McAusland
2005, L¶ opez et al. 2007).
We have assumed that the Poor cannot save and that production is completely
exhausted by their consumption. From equation 2, it follows that per capita





The Poor that are hired in the sector of market goods receive a real wage equals
to w (in terms of the private good produced by the Rich) that is considered
as exogenously given. By (3) the Poor are indi®erent between the work in the
traditional sector and that in the capitalistic one if it holds
cP = acs = aw (4)
which can be re-expressed as
1
a




®E > w (respectively
1
a
®E < w), then no Poor (respectively all Poor, i.e.
N) would like to work in the capitalistic sector. It is to note that E is taken
as exogenously given by the Poor, that is they do not internalize the impact
of their production on natural resources. However we will return to this issue
later. In equation 5 the parameter a determines the di®erence between the wage
in the capitalistic sector and the average output in the rural sector that allow
for the same level of utility. The alignment of labour income between the two
sectors (from condition (5)) is consistent with the role of rural sector as indica-
tor of the labour opportunity cost 11 in other sectors. In the economy labour
supply is a®ected by two factors: on one hand, an increase in wage rate (due
for example to an augmentation in labour demand) represents a \pull" factor
of labour force; on the other one, environmental depletion constitutes a \push"
factor of labour force. Natural resource stock degradation causes a decline in
labour productivity in the rural sector (for example the rural Poor have to move
to other zones from polluted rivers or from eroded areas, they have to walk for
longer distance to collect potable water etc.). This leads to a decrease in the
opportunity cost of the labour force and to a movement of labour to the market
sector. In turn, as we will see below, the labour supply increase may depress
wages in the economy providing the Rich with cheap labour.
10In the traditional sector the labour payment tend to be not based on marginal product
activity, but on income sharing. Thus people that work in this sector receive the average
product (Ray, 1998).
11The alignment should be corrected for skill di®erentials, but in this model we have ne-
glected the distinction between skilled and unskilled workers
82.2 The production in the capitalistic sector
The population of the Rich is constituted by a continuum of identical individuals
and the size of the population is represented by the positive parameter M . We
normalize the size of the R-population by assuming M = 1 . As said, the
representative R-agent employs all her ¯xed potential labour in market sector
as entrepreneurial activity. Without loss of plausibility, we assume that the
marginal product of entrepreneur labour in the market sector is higher than
marginal product of labour in the subsistence sector. Therefore the possibility
that the Rich work in subsistence sector is excluded a priori and the production
function of the market sector can be speci¯ed as follows
YR = K²EÁ(NR)1¡²¡Á (6)
where:
² > 0, Á ¸ 0 and ² + Á < 1 (the production function satis¯es the constant
returns to scale assumption); K is the physical capital accumulated by the
representative R-agent. We consider the value of K as exogenously given an we
analyse the e®ects that an increase in K produces on E, on P-agents' labour
allocation and on well-being of P and R-agents. In companion paper (Antoci,
Russu and Ticci 2008) we have introduced, in the same context, the dynamics
of K generated by R-agents' intertemporal optimization choices obtaining very
similar results, but at the expenses of analytical simplicity.
Function (6) is increasing in all its inputs, is concave and it satis¯es the Inada
conditions in K and NR, while, as E approaches to zero, its marginal output
tends to in¯nitive only if Á > 0. If Á = 0 , environmental resources do not enter
into the production function of the Rich.
2.3 Dynamics of natural capital
P and R-agents consider the e®ect of their choices on environment as negligible
and they do not internalize it, therefore in their maximization problems they
take the evolution of E as given. They behave without taking into account
of the shadow value of the natural resource and, as a result, nobody has an
incentive to preserve or restore natural resources. Thus, investment in natural
capital does not a®ect the environmental stock and the dynamics of E can be
9described by the usual logistic function modi¯ed for human intervention
_ E = E(E ¡ E) ¡ ¯®NPE ¡ °Y R (7)
where the parameter E represents the carrying capacity of the environmental
resource, that is the maximum stock at which E stabilizes in absence of negative
impacts due to P and R-agents' economic activities; ¯®NPEÂ is the aggregate
environmental impact by the rural sector and the parameter 0 < ¯ < 1 repre-
sents exploitation of natural resource by P-agents;
0 < ° < 1 is a parameter measuring the environmental deterioration caused
by the average production Y R of R-agents. Assuming identical Rich agents, it
follows that Y R = YR .
2.4 The maximization problem of the representative R-
agent
Preferences of the Rich are assumed to be representable by an utility function
de¯ned over consumption of the private good. Let the R-agent's instantaneous
utility be:
Ur(cR) = lncR (8)
Therefore UR is twice continuously di®erentiable, strictly increasing and strictly
concave, i.e. U0
R > 0 and U00
R < 0 . The representative R-agent maximizes her
utility by choosing the labour demand NR to maximize
YR ¡ wNR = K²EÁ(NR)1¡²¡Á ¡ wNR (9)
where w is taken as given; since there is not accumulation, it holds cR = YR ¡
wNR. The solution to the R-agent's problem is found maximizing (9) with
respect to NR
(1 ¡ ² ¡ Á)K²EÁ(NR)¡²¡Á = w (10)
Equation (10) gives the R-agent's choice of NR for every w.
2.5 Labour market equilibrium
We assume that the labour market is perfectly competitive and wage is °exible.
We will come back later on the implications of these assumption. The equilib-
10rium value of NP (and, consequently, of NR = N ¡NP) is given by the solution
of the following labour market equilibrium condition (obtained by equalizing
left sides of (5) and (10))
®
a
E = (1 ¡ ² ¡ Á)K²EÁ(N ¡ NP)¡²¡Á (11)
that is
NP = N ¡
·
a(1 ¡ ² ¡ Á)K²
®E1¡Á
¸ 1
² + Á (12)
if the right side (12) is not negative, otherwise NP = 0 (i.e. N Poor work in the
capitalistic sector). Notice that, by (12), NP is increasing in E and decreasing
in K.
By substituting NP = 0 in (12) and solving it with respect to E we get
E = E¤ :=
·




1 ¡ Á (13)
where E¤is the threshold value of E that separates the region (E > E¤) where
NP > 0 from that (E · E¤) where NP = 0.
By substituting NR with the equilibrium value of N¡NP in (10) the equilibrium
wage is found and it can be used in (9) to obtain the R-agent's consumption
level cR.
2.6 Dynamics
Substituting the equilibrium value of NP in (7) and taking into account that
(ex-post) Y R is equal to YR, the dynamics generated by the model are given by
the following equation
_ E = E(E ¡ E) ¡ ¯®NPE ¡ °±K²EÁ(N ¡ NP)1¡²¡Á (14)
where NP = 0 for E · E¤ while NP is given by (12) for E > E¤.
113 Mathematical results
Fixed points of dynamics (14) are given by the values of E ¸ 0 satisfying the
equation
_ E = E(E ¡ E) ¡ ¯®NPE ¡ °±K²EÁ(N ¡ NP)1¡²¡Á = 0 (15)











a(1 ¡ ² ¡ Á)
®
, separates, in the plane (E;K), the regions in which
1 > NP > 0 (on the right of the graph of l(E)) and in which NP = 0 (on the


























gives the ¯xed point values of E which correspond to every (¯xed) value of the
parameter K. In the regime NP = 0, E = 0 is always a ¯xed point; the values of








² ¢ (E ¡ E)
1
²
for every ¯xed value of K.
The threshold values E0, E01 and E02, in ¯gure 1, are given by
E0 := E ¡
®°±N
a(1 ¡ ² ¡ Á)
12Inada conditions exclude the case NP = 1 and NR = 0.
12E01 :=
®°±(1 + ²)N






a(1 ¡ ² ¡ Á)
Straightforward computations show that the ¯xed point E = 0 is always locally
attractive; the other ¯xed points in the regime NP = 0 are attractive (respec-
tively, repulsive) when corresponding to the decreasing (increasing) portion of
the graph of g(E). In Figures 1.a-1.e, the ¯xed points in the regime 1 > NP > 0
are attractive (respectively, repulsive) when corresponding to the decreasing
(increasing) portion of the graph of f(E); in Figures 1.f-1.g, they are always
attractive.
From ¯gure 1 we can observe that four ¯xed points with E > 0 may simultane-
osly exist. Figure 2 shows an example in which this happens for some values of
the parameter K belonging to the interval (200;250); in such case, there exist
three attracting ¯xed points, as ¯gure 3 shows (the attracting ¯xed points are
indicated by full dots); in the attracting ¯xed points E = 0 and EB0, it holds
NP = 0 while in the attracting ¯xed point EB we have NP > 0. Figure 4 shows
dynamics corresponding to the speci¯cation of parameters in ¯gure 2 and with
K = 100. In such case, we observe a bi-stable regime where only two ¯xed
points are attracting, E = 0 and EB, where NP = 0 and NP > 0, respectively.
Figure 5 shows how ¯xed point values of E are a®ected by an increase of the pa-
rameters ¯, ° and K (the other parameters are ¯xed as in the exaMple showed
in ¯gure 2).
Continuous and dotted lines represent, respectively, attracting and repulsive
¯xed points; furthermore, in the ¯xed points A and B it holds 1 > NP > 0,
while in A0 and B0 it holds NP = 0.
4 Classi¯cation of structural changes
Identifying a structural change whit a reduction of NP, in our model a structural
change occurs every time the economy follows a trajectory with a decreasing
value of E (see by (12)).
13By (3) and (4), Poor's consumption and the equilibrium wage w are positively
correlated to the value of the stock E. Therefore, well-being of the Poor de-
creases (increases) every time the economy follow a trajectory along which the
value of E decreases (decreases).





1 ¡ ² ¡ 2Á
² + Á (16)
if NP > 0 and by
cR = (² + Á)K²EÁN
if NP = 0, where
T := (² + Á)
·
a(1 ¡ ² ¡ Á)
®
¸1 ¡ ² ¡ Á
² + Á
Therefore, in the context NP > 0, the e®ect on cR generated by a reduction of
E depends on the sign of the exponent ¡
1 ¡ ² ¡ 2Á
² + Á
; in particular, if Á >
1 ¡ ²
2
(respectively, if Á <
1 ¡ ²
2
) there exists a positive (negative) correlation between
cR and E.
Notice that the parameter Á measures the \importance" of the input E in the




then the Rich are able to compensate the negative e®ects of environmental de-
terioration by the reduction of equilibrium wages.
With K constant, structural changes occur every time the economy follows a
trajectory along which E is decreasing and are driven by push forces in that NP
decreases as a consequence of environmental degradation and the consequent
reduction of P-agents' labour opportunity cost. Furthermore, they always lead
to a reduction of P-agents' well-being; as said above, this reduction is accompa-
nied by an increase of R-agents' well-being if Á <
1 ¡ ²
2
(in such case, we have




. Therefore, structural changes are always associated to a reduction
of P-agents' well-being.
Now, it is interesting to see what happens to P and R-agents' well-being when
an exogenous increase of K occurs; in such case, we may expect to observe
14structural changes generating an improvement of P-agents' well-being. In fact,
this may be the case if the environmental impact of the capitalistic sector is low
enough, as we shall see.
Our analysis will focus on the (unique) attracting ¯xed point without special-
ization, i.e. where 1 > NP > 0, when existing (let us indicate it by the symbol
B). Figure 1 shows how the value of E, evaluated at B, varies acconding to
an increase of the parameter K. Notice in the cases represented in Figures
1.a-1.e, an increase of K generates a reduction of the value of E in B; the op-
posite holds in cases represented in Figures 1.f and 1.g13. So, in Figures 1.a-1.e,
starting from B, an increase of K leads to a structural change (by (12)) which
generates a reduction of P-agents' well-being (by (1)-(3)); the opposite holds in
Figures 1.f-1.g, where the increase of E rises the opportunity cost of labour and
consequently the equilibrium wage w.
Note that the cases in Figures 1.f-1.g are characterized by a relatively high neg-
ative inpact on E by the traditional sector (with respect to that of the modern
sector).
Let us now consider the e®ects of an increase of K on R-agents' well-being.
Observe that, in Figures 1.f-1.g, K and E (evaluated at the ¯xed point B) are
positively correlated; consequently, by (16), cR increases when K increases. In
Figures 1.a-1.e, K and E are negatively correlated; to evaluate the e®ects of an
increase of K on R-agents' well-being, we write (16) as follows
cR = T ¢




















if and only if
°±
M
¡ ®¯ > 0
13Remember that, in Figures 1.a-1.e (respectively, Figures 1.f-1.g), the value of E in B is
given by the intersection between the horizontal line K = K (where K is the accumulation
level of the economy) and the decreasing (respectively, increasing) portion of the graph of
f(E).
15that is (being M = a(1 ¡ " ¡ Á)=®)
¯ >
°±
a(1 ¡ " ¡ Á)
(17)
It is easy to check that (17) is never satis¯ed in cases in Figures 1.a-1.e and,
consequently, cR always increases when K increases (even if E decreases).
Figures 6.a-6.b represent numerical simulations of cases showed in Figures 2 and
1.f, respectively, and show how the values of cR and E change, evaluated at the
attracting ¯xed points B0 (where NP = 0) and B (where 1 > NP > 0), when
K increases. The arrows indicate the path followed when K increases. Note
that, in both Figures, cR and K are positively correlated; the same holds for cP
and K in ¯gure 1.b (remember that cP and E are positively correlated) while
a negative correlation is observed between cP and K in ¯gure 1.a.
To summing up, the structural changes that may occur in our model can be
classi¯ed in three di®erent typologies:
Pro-Rich structural change: Labour moves out from the subsistence sector,
the environmental stock declines as well as Poor agents' consumption, while the
Rich agent's consumption grows. Thus, this structural change is characterized
by environmental degradation and increase in inequality.
Positive structural change: In this case, the structural change leads to a
Pareto improvement. Both the Rich and the Poor are bene¯ted and environ-
ment is preserved (this type of structural change may occur only if K increases).
Perverse structural change: In this case, environmental degradation push
labour force to the capitalistic sector but both the Rich and the Poor are harmed
by the reduction in natural capital endowment, i.e. both cR and cP decrease.
Pro-Rich structural change tipically occurs in a context in which the modern




and the negative environmental impact ° of the capitalistic sector is relatively
high. In such context, the model tends to be a zero-sum game. Physical capi-
tal endowments allow the Rich to employ wage labour and this possibility lies
at the roots of a con°ict between the Rich (labour employers), and the Poor
(labour force providers). The Rich are more able to defend themselves from en-
vironmental degradation because they can partially substitute natural capital
with physical capital and wage labour employment. Thus, the Rich are not
disadvantaged by the environmental degradation because they can rely on sub-
stitution possibilities as a defensive strategy. On the contrary, they may bene¯t
16from the role played by the natural capital scarcity in accelerating human re-
sources mobilization and shift of labour supply from the traditional sector to
the modern one. Therefore they take advantage of the possibility to exploit
labour at a lower cost. On the other hand, the Poor are harmed because they
face a reduction in productivity of their labour, namely of their major mean of
subsistence.
Positive structural change may be observed in a context in which the modern
sector has a relatively low negative impact ° on the environmental resource and
so the structural change is driven by pull forces (i.e. by an increase of K rather
than a reduction of E). Furthermore, the dependence of the modern sector on
E is not negligible (i.e. Á is not too low) so that the increase of equilibrium
wages is counterbalanced by an increase of E, this produces an increase of cR.
Perverse structural change may happen in a context in which the modern sector




negative environmental impact ° of the capitalistic sector is relatively high. In
such context, R-agents are not able to compensate the reduction of E by the
mobilization of human resources due to environmental degradation (in a context
of decreasing equilibrium wages). Therefore, the Rich are more vulnerable to
environmental degradation, which produces an impact with the same sign to the
Rich and the Poor. Therefore, environmental policies may be win-win strate-
gies; in this context, there is not a trade-o® between goals of poverty alleviation,
economic growth and environmental preservation.
According to the mainstream view, a growth in total factor productivity of
the modern sector is always seen as a positive factor leading to growth and, at
least in the long term, poverty reduction. On the contrary, the model shows
that this scenario might occur only if the modern sector has a relatively low
environmental impact in comparison to the traditional one. In this case, a rise
in K determines an increase in wage of workers employed by the Rich as well
as an augmentation of E. At the same time the movement of labour caused
by an increase in labour demand reduces the demographic pressures on natural
resources with positive e®ect on labour productivity in the subsistence sector
too.
Our model highlights a novel requirement for positive structural changes: labour
ri-allocation towards the non subsistence sector can be associated with poverty
reduction only if the capitalistic sector is not too polluting, namely it produces
relatively low environmental externalities in comparison to the traditional ac-
17tivities. The positive structural change also represents the labour transition
associated with the highest level of labour productivity because it occurs when
there is a growth of total factor productivity as well as of all productive in-
puts. Therefore the positive structural change also insures the best economic
performances of the capitalistic sector in comparison to the other typologies
of structural changes. Looking at policy implications, we can conclude that
policies aiming at promoting a positive structural change require that govern-
ment support to capitalistic sector productivity does not include measures too
permissive in terms of environmental externalities.
5 Undesirable economic growth
When we consider distributive and environmental dynamics in a joint frame-
work, some scenarios neglected by the literature can emerge. The economic
literature in general agrees that, although economic growth does not insure per
se an increase in well-being of the Poor, positive economic performance is a
necessary condition for poverty alleviation. This entails that policies aiming at
stimulating economic growth are consistent with objectives of poverty reduction
that, in turn, is likely to result in relieving pressures on natural resources and
in helping environmental conservation. On the contrary, the consequences of an
increase in K when the modern sector is too polluting raise doubts about this
expected virtuous relationship between economic growth, poverty reduction and
preservation of ecosystems and about capitalistic sector expansion as panacea
for poverty reduction. Indeed, in this scenario the environmental externalities
may contribute generating an undesirable and self-reinforcing path of expansion
of the modern sector associated with a process of impoverishment: the capital-
istic sector grows producing push forces on the Poor due to the environmental
pressures, labour moves out the subsistence sector and the capitalistic sector
further expands14. This unexpected result may be explained by the fact that
positive impact of a growing on the wage is overcome by down pressures on w
because of the environmental degradation caused by the modern sector's ex-
pansion. Thus, an increase in K may reduce well-being of the Poor if it is not
associated with counterbalancing factors such as a rise in ® (namely total factor
productivity of the traditional sector) or a reduction in ° (i.e. environmental
14Analogous results about the indesiderability of economic growth are obtained in Antoci
(1996), Antoci and Bartolini (1999, 2004), Antoci et al. (2005), where environmental goods
are considered as ¯nal goods rather than inputs.
18impact of the capitalistic sector). The values of ®, ° and K can be a®ected by
public choices. Therefore, looking at the policy implications of these ¯ndings,
it could be argued that governments should take into account the possibility of
such perverse mechanisms in their decisions about allocation of public expendi-
ture. If the public funds focus only on the modern sector neglecting productivity
of the subsistence sector the result may be an immiserizing growth, namely an
output growth that worsens income distribution.
6 Possible extensions of the model
The model examines a simpli¯ed economy and a perfect polarization between
the representative agents. The purpose was to identify and focus to some links
between asset distribution, well-being and environmental dynamics that are
likely to be relevant in developing countries, but implications drawn from this
analysis cannot be considered exhaustive. Indeed, some important aspects that
might deserve further attention in future extensions of the model can be cited:
1) Under a more realistic perspective, the capitalistic sector can be inter-
preted as the combination of the (primary and non primary ) modern
activities and the non primary sector of informal small enterprises. In
the model the labour market is perfectly competitive with °exible wages
and full employment. Labour supply is determined by conditions in the
subsistence rural sector and it is completely absorbed by the sector of the
Rich. Conversely, if wages were rigid or they could not decrease below a
minimum level, a labour surplus would emerge and would lead to a better
sectoral diversi¯cation between the modern and the informal urban activ-
ities. In this case it would be interesting to analyse changes in dynamics
generated by our model in terms of distributional and environmental im-
pact. Under the assumption of wage rigidity or the existence of minimum
wages, the linkage between the negative externalities and production in
the modern sector may weaken and it should be possible to highlight wage
di®erentials and, in particular, between the agents working in the subsis-
tence or informal sectors and employees in the modern sector.
2) This is a model of supply-led growth and well-being, and the role of private
demand is neglected. In fact, an increase in income inequality and a
further impoverishment of the working class may depress demand and
19inhibit economic growth. It would be interesting to develop the present
model including the impact of inequality and poverty on growth through
the channel of domestic demand (forward and backward linkages between
the sectors). The model also neglects the role of the traditional sector as
supplier of food (i.e. wage goods), but in open middle-income countries the
channel of food prices in boosting industrialization and economic growth
is less likely to operate.
3) Given that many developing countries are a®ected by ill-de¯ned property
rights, open access has been studied as an extreme case of this institutional
failure. Moreover many environmental services or goods are public goods:
some examples are the mitigation of °oods and drought, soil renewal, pro-
vision of fuels, energy, fresh water and biodiversity, and marine resources.
Anyway, the introduction of another type of natural asset characterized
by communitarian or private property (for example land) could be inves-
tigated in order to assess whether other property right regimes are likely
to lead to di®erent results. Final results can be expected to depend on the
assumptions related to the initial distribution of natural resources, while
the choice of the property regime typology might be less informative in
terms of environmental outcomes. Nevertheless the comparison with other
tenure right arrangements could provide interesting suggestions.
4) In this model, natural capital has two main peculiarities: ¯rstly, it is a
public free access resource whose services are used by the whole popula-
tion, Poor people included; secondly, it is subject to underinvestment and
overexploitation problems because it produces positive externalities and it
is a®ected by negative externalities. The present model could be modi¯ed
by including other public goods (R&D, infrastructures, development and
strengthening of institutions etc) whose bene¯ts are distributed across all
the population or other assets with characteristics of semi-public goods
such as human capital.
7 Conclusions
Nowadays no development strategy can avoid considering environmental dynam-
ics, externalities of human activities under a distributive perspective. Environ-
mental problems (the depletion of marine stocks, soil erosion, land degradation,
lost of forests and biodiversity, air contamination and global warming e®ects)
20have become a major concern in the international agenda, while the Poor, not
only tend to rely more than the Rich on natural resources but they also are less
able to defend themselves from environmental degradation.
This article has attempted to study the linkage between environmental resources
and labour and output composition by taking into account two main factors that
have been partially neglected by the economic development literature: the envi-
ronmental externalities of human activities and agent's heterogeneity in terms
of asset endowment and, consequently, in terms of income source and vulnera-
bility to depletion of natural resources.
The proposed model have shown that the introduction of these factors adds
new elements in the analysis of these link and permits to shed light on agents'
di®erences in feed-back mechanisms and interactions between their choices and
environmental dynamics.
We have proposed a taxonomy of structural changes typologies on the basis
of distributive, environmental and economic impact and we have attempted
to identify under which conditions each structural change regime can occur.
Firstly, the work has identi¯ed new requirements for prompting positive struc-
tural changes, i.e. a movement of labour to capitalistic activities associated with
poverty reduction and the alleviation of environmental pressures. In particular,
the capitalistic sector has to produce a relatively low impact on natural re-
sources. Secondly, we have found that the existence of counter-intuitive results
cannot be excluded: an increase in total factor productivity of the capitalistic
sector (or other factors leading to the growth of this sector) might stimulate a
self-reinforcing and immiserizing growth, namely an output growth that results
in a further impoverishment of the Poor and in a worsening of income distri-
bution. This ¯nding suggests that proper caution is to be adopted in designing
government measures which emphasize only physical capital accumulation or
expansion of the market sector with the purpose of alleviating poverty via eco-
nomic growth. Indeed, some \collateral" e®ects may jeopardize the bene¯ts of
economic growth causing environmental degradation and impoverishment pro-
cesses.
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Figure 1: Fixed points con¯gurations varying the value of the parameter K.


















Figure 2: A numerical example in which four ¯xed points (A0 and B0 with
NP = 0, A and B with NP > 0) with E > 0 exist. The parameters are:

















Figure 4: Dynamic regime corresponding to the example of Figure 2, with
K = 100






















































Figure 5: A numerical example showing how the environmental stock E, eval-
uated at the ¯xed points A and B with NP > 0, A0 and B0 with NP = 0,
changes varying the parameter ¯, °, and K. The dotted (continuous) lines
represent repulsive (attractive) ¯xed points.


































Figure 6: A numerical example showing how the values of cR and E, evalu-
ated at the attracting ¯xed points B0 (with NP = 0) and B (with NP > 0),
change varying the parameter K. The arrows indicate the path followed when
K increase. Remember that cP and E are positively correlated.
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